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Abstract
We explore the effects of competitive and cooperative motivations on con-
tributions in a field experiment. 10,000 potential political donors received
solicitations referencing past contribution behavior of members of the compet-
ing party (competition treatment), the same party (cooperative treatment),
or no past contribution information (control). Contribution rates in the com-
petitive, cooperative, and control treatments were 1.45%, 1.08%, and 0.78%,
respectively. With the exception of one large contribution, the distribution of
contributions in the competitive treatment first order stochastically dominates
that of the cooperative treatment. Qualitatively, it appears that the coop-
erative treatment induced more contributions around the common monetary
reference point, while the competitive treatment led to more contributions at
twice this amount. These results suggest that eliciting competitive rather than
cooperative motivations can lead to higher contributions in intergroup public
good settings.
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People’s contributions to public goods are affected by the contributions of oth-
ers. For example, it has been demonstrated that individuals choose to match the
past contribution decisions and amounts of other contributors to the same public
good, a result commonly attributed to pro-social cooperative behavior (Fischbacher,
Gächter, and Fehr 2001; Frey and Meier 2004; Shang and Croson 2009). It has
also been suggested that competitive motivations across groups can lead to increased
public good contributions within groups (Erev, Bornstein, and Galili 1993; Bornstein
and Ben-Yossef 1994; Bornstein, Gneezy, and Nagel 2002). In this paper, we pro-
vide a test of this competition hypothesis using a natural field experiment, and we
directly compare the effects of competitive and cooperative donating environments.
Specifically, we solicited donors engaged in a competitive public good game and
presented them with information about the contributions of members of their own
group, contributions of members of the competing group, or no information about
the contribution of others (the control group). Our results suggest that competitive
motives are potentially more useful in driving higher contribution rates and total
contributions.
The field experiment involved sending one of three types of solicitation post-
cards to 10,000 potential donors to a Democratic candidate’s 2008 campaign for the
U.S. House of Representatives. Two of the postcard designs contained a reference
to average past contribution amounts of a reference group: either Democrats (the
cooperative treatment) or Republicans (the competitive treatment). Specifically,
the reference in the postcard for the competitive treatment reads "Small Republican
contributions have been averaging $28" while the reference in the postcard for the
cooperative treatment reads "Small Democratic contributions have been averaging
$28."1 As both treatments reference the same monetary amount, we can indepen-
dently identify the differential effect of the referenced group. The third postcard type
(the control treatment) neither referenced past contribution amounts, nor mentioned
1Note that these are true statements given that we define "small" contributions as those less
than $75 (see Section 2 below). For a similar use of this type of definition, see Frey and Meier
(2004).
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a reference group. As such, we can also identify the joint effect of referencing a group
(one’s own group or the competing group) and a past reference amount.
The political contribution environment we study can be seen as a close analog of
the intergroup public good (IPG) game suggested by Rapoport and Bornstein (1987),
which is commonly used in laboratory research on competitive effects in public good
games. In the IPG, individuals in two groups choose contribution amounts and
members of the group with the largest collective amount of contributions are given a
larger reward than members of the other party. In political races, donors contribute
to a party and larger contributions (amongst other factors) lead to a higher chance
of that party winning the race, giving a larger benefit to donors to that party.
We find that the contribution rates in the competitive, cooperative, and con-
trol treatments were 1.45%, 1.08%, and 0.78%, respectively. Furthermore, with the
exception of one larger contribution, the distribution of contributions (conditional
on a positive contribution) in the competitive treatment first order stochastically
dominates that of the cooperative treatment. The cooperative treatment induced
more contributions concentrated near the common reference point ($28), while the
competitive treatment induced more contributions at nearly twice the level of this
reference point (about $50). As a result of these effects at both the intensive and
extensive margins, the cooperative and competitive treatments yielded 15 percent
and 82 percent higher total monetary contributions than the control, respectively.
We temper these results by noting that the contribution rate and the total amount
collected from the cooperative treatment is not statistically significantly different
than that of the control, a result partially driven by low contribution rates.
These results demonstrate that intra-group competition can drive higher con-
tribution rates and amounts than inter-group cooperation in a natural public good
environment. This is an important finding for two reasons. First, it suggests that the
competitive desire for own-group victory could be a strong motivator in other public
good games. Second, this is the first paper to our knowledge that tests the impacts
of different contribution motivations in a political environment. Political campaigns
are one of the most important contribution environments, not least because of the
sums of money involved, and our findings provide important insights into incentives
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for such contributions.
Several papers have previously estimated the effect of social information on so-
licitation behavior.2 Frey and Meier (2004) conducted a field experiment in which
students were asked to contribute to a university fundraising campaign. The authors
find an increase, albeit small, in the contribution rate when students were informed
that a higher percentage of students had contributed to the campaign in the past.
Similarly, Shang and Croson (2006, 2009) and Shang, Reed, and Croson (2008) use
multiple field experiments with a public radio fundraising drive to study the effect
of social information on contribution amounts. These papers use a variety of social
comparisons ("A member like you just contributed...", "She just contributed...") and
an array of reference points to show that social comparisons can affect contribution
rates and amounts.
Several papers have also studied the effect of intergroup competition on intra-
group cooperation. In the laboratory, Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) show that
participants are twice as likely to cooperate in a prisoner’s dilemma game when it is
embedded in a game with intragroup competition. Similarly, Bornstein, Gneezy, and
Nagel (2002) demonstrate that intergroup competition increases intergroup efficiency
in a minimal-effort coordination game. In a laboratory-like field experiment, Erev,
Bornstein, and Galili (1993) show that subjects’ productivity increases (in picking
oranges) when there is competition across groups.
Most of this research explores competitive effects using the IPG or close varia-
tions.3 While our environment is reasonably close to a pure IPG, there are some
important differences. First, the mapping from contributions to party success is
noisy (the party with a smaller level of contributions could win).4 Second, larger
2A large literature has also studied the independent effect of reference points on contribution
behavior in cooperative situations (DeJong and Oopik 1992; Desmet and Feinberg 2003; Fraser, Hite
and Sauer 1988; Schibrowsky and Peltier 1995; Smith and Berger 1996; Weyant 1996). Broadly, this
literature concludes that the relative size of the referenced amount matter, with higher reference
points increasing contribution amounts yet decreasing the propensity to contribute.
3The exception is Bornstein, Gneezy, and Nagel (2002), who use a “minimal-effort” game where
the winning group is determined by comparing the smallest contribution made in each group
4This occurs because parties have other attributes which affect voter’s decision. This can be
modeled as an IPG in which both sides start with a different initial contribution base based on
their attributes.
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contributions might lead to larger individual rewards (such as political favors) as
the game is not completely anonymous. Finally, in a broader context, the game
is sequential rather than simultaneous, although our field experiment is essentially
simultaneous. Even with these limitations, the political contribution environment
reflects an important real-life example of the IPG game.
More generally, this paper relates to a growing literature on the motivations
for charitable contributions and the effect of various incentives to make charitable
contributions, such as matching schemes (Huck and Rasul 2008), seed money (List
and Lucking-Reily 2002), rebates (Eckel and Grossman 2005), and gift exchange
(Falk 2007).
In the next section, we describe the contribution environment and the field exper-
iment. Section 3 presents the experimental results on differential contribution rates
and amounts across treatment groups. Section 4 concludes with a discussion of these
results.
2 The Field Experiment
2.1 The Congressional Election and the Intervention
The experiment took place during a 2008 campaign for the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives in the state of Florida. We worked with the Democratic challenger who
had not previously run for a national public office; the incumbent was a long-serving
Republican. Informal discussions with local Democrats made it clear that two factors
were contributing to a general belief that their candidate could win the race, and
this belief was driving contributions. First, there was expected to be a higher-than-
usual turnout amongst Black voters for the concurrent presidential campaign (Barak
Obama versus John McCain) - most Black voters in the district are Democrats and
it was believed they would also vote the for the Democratic Congressional candidate.
Second, the majority of votes cast in-district for the U.S. Senate race two years earlier
had been for the Democratic candidate, signaling a shift in political preferences.
Working with the candidate, we identified 10,000 potential donors who were to
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receive a solicitation postcard in the final weeks of the campaign. This sample
was chosen from a list of past donors to Democratic campaigns and a set of voters
identified as strong Democrats from their participation in past primary elections
(as determined by public voting records). The majority (about 70 percent) of the
recipients lived in the congressional district contested by our candidate, while the
remainder lived in other districts in Florida.
Subjects received one of three treatment postcards. Each contained a large picture
of the candidate and a short message urging them to contribute to the campaign:
see Figure 1. The text of the postcard was written to convey the message that
the race was close and that marginal contributions could be pivotal. The main
difference between the treatments was a single emphasized sentence in the center of
the message:5
Control treatment: "Your contribution can make a big difference."
Cooperative treatment: "Small Democratic contributions have been averaging
$28."
Competitive treatment: "Small Republican contributions have been averaging
$28."
Past contribution data was obtained from the publicly available Federal Election
Commission online database (www.fec.gov). We implicitly define "small" contribu-
tions as those less than $75: the average of current election cycle contributions less
than $75 was equal for our Democratic candidate ($28) and the Republican candidate
($28) at this cutoff.6 We performed the experiment with two broad hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. Social information about one’s peers, whether cooperative or
competitive, will make a recipient more likely to donate.
5The other difference is that the $28 reference point in the Cooperative and Competitive treat-
ments is repeated in small text stating how contributions can be spent (see Figure 1).
6This specific (implicit) cutoff choice was chosen so that we could truthfully state the same
reference amount for both experimental groups. However, by not explicitly stating the cutoff
amount, there is a concern that people might interpret these messages differently depending on
their definition of “small.” Campaign staff believed the message would be interpreted in a consistent
way and (strongly) discouraged the message “... contributions less than $75 have been averaging
$28” due to its specificity and complexity.
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Hypothesis 2. The amount donated will be affected by both the monetary refer-
ence point and the referenced peer group.
2.2 Data and Identification
Recipients were randomly assigned to one of the three treatment groups using
a simple randomization algorithm. After the election, we obtained demographic
and voting characteristics of the recipients by matching names and addresses with
Florida’s public-record voter files. This match was successful for 88 percent of the
sample, including all of the actual contributors.7 In order to include non-matched
recipients in the regression analysis below, we include an indicator for missing de-
mographic information.
Table 1 summarizes our data. Column 1 characterizes the sample as a whole.
Recipients are mostly older (around 61 years old) and white (around 84 percent),
largely reflecting the demographic make-up of the Democratic voting population in
this congressional district. As expected, the majority of the sample consists of reg-
istered Democrats, although 6 percent are registered Republicans. Furthermore, 72
percent of the postcard recipients had voted in a past primary, reflecting a relatively
large interest in politics amongst this sample.
Columns 2 through 4 of Table 1 contain mean characteristics by treatment group,
and columns 5 through 7 contain p-values from F-tests of the pair-wise equality of
the means across groups. These data suggest the randomization was successful; the
pre-treatment demographics are for the most part indistinguishable across groups.
For two variables, there are significant differences across groups: age differs between
control and both cooperative and competitive groups, and there are significantly
more registered Republicans in the control versus cooperative groups. Under the
assumption that the sample is also balanced across unobserved covariates of con-
tribution outcomes, the random assignment to treatment allows us to identify the
causal impact of treatments relative to one another.
7Unmatched recipients likely either had significantly misspelled names or had recently moved.
Unmatched recipients account for 12.25, 13.13, and 12.42 percent of the control, competitive, and
cooperative groups, respectively (differences between these levels are not statistically significant).
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Soon after the mailings were sent out, the candidate began to receive contributions
in the mail and online which were recorded by campaign staff. Two data collection
issues are of note.
First, concurrent with our experiment, the candidate was involved in other cam-
paign activities (such as a fund-raising concert) which may have prompted contribu-
tions from recipients of the experimental postcards. In most cases, such contributions
were identified by the campaign staff and we do not include them in our analysis. In
a few cases, however, it was impossible to determine the impetus for a contribution.
To isolate the impact of our solicitation postcards, we only use contributions that
were made one week after the receipt of the mailing. The results presented below
are robust to changes in this window of acceptance.
Second, it was discovered after the mailings were sent out that some recipients
were accidentally sent two postcards, and hence were placed in two different treat-
ment groups; as these recipients were exposed to more than one treatment, we drop
them in the subsequent analysis, leaving a total of 9,954 subjects.8
3 Results
Contribution Rates
Our first main result concerns contribution rates. Table 2 contains contribution
rates for the sample as a whole and across groups, along with p-values from F-tests
of equality of means across groups. Overall, the contribution rate was 1.11 percent
(column 1), which was close to the expectation of the campaign (they expected
around a 1 percent contribution rate in general). This table suggests our first main
result:
Finding 1. The use of social information and a reference point increased the
likelihood of contributing. The contribution rate in the competitive treatment was
8After this correction, the control, competitive, cooperative treatments contain 3315, 3321,
and 3318 subjects, respectively. There is no significant difference in the percentage of duplicated
subjects in each treatment group.
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85 percent higher than that of the control treatment (p-value=0.01), and 34 percent
higher than the cooperative treatment (p-value=0.16). The cooperative treatment in-
duced a 38 percent higher contribution rate than the control, although not significantly
so (p-value=0.24).
While this first finding suggests that the competitive treatment led to a greater
effect on the extensive margin than the control, the effect of the cooperative treatment
is less clear, due to large standard errors and that the point estimate falls nearly
exactly between the estimates of other groups.
Due to the slight imbalance across groups in some baseline observable charac-
teristics, a preferred model may be one which controls for these variables. Table 3,
columns 1 and 2, present estimates from Probit models estimating relative proba-
bilities of contributing, with and without controlling for pre-treatment demograph-
ics; perhaps not surprisingly, these models give similar results to the comparison in
means.9 Table 3 also demonstrates that older recipients are more likely to contribute
to our Democratic candidate, while registered Republicans (relative to registered
Democrats) and Black recipients (relative to White recipients) are less likely to con-
tribute.
Contribution Distribution
Our second main result concerns the intensive margin of contributing. The sec-
ond and third rows of Table 2 compare mean contribution amounts, for both the
entire sample and for the sample of those who actually contributed. For the sample
as a whole (column 1), the mean contribution is $0.70, while the mean contribution
conditional on donating is $63.10. Note that while the unconditional mean contribu-
tion is marginally different between the control and competitive treatment (p-value
= 0.13), this difference is largely driven by the differential contribution rates; upon
conditioning on a strictly positive contribution, mean contribution amounts are in-
distinguishable across all groups. We again test for the robustness of this comparison
9These results are robust to the “rare event bias” described in King and Zeng (1999a), a bias
arising in discrete dependent variable models when the event (a contribution, in our case) is observed
a relatively low percentage of the time.
9
in means by controlling for all observable individual characteristics in a regression
setting. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 3 show that treatment effects are virtually un-
changed by the slight baseline differences in observables.
Average contribution amounts, however, mask important and significant differ-
ences in the distributions of conditional contributions across treatments, as can be
seen in Figure 2. To see these differences more clearly, the histograms in Figure 3 plot
the difference in contribution distributions between the competitive group and the
control, and the cooperative group and the control. (We remove contributions over
$100, which represent 6 percent of contributions, for visual ease.) The randomized
assignment of treatment allows us to interpret these histograms as the "additional"
effect of the cooperative and competitive treatments above the control. The major-
ity of additional contributions in the cooperative treatment appear to be centered
in the $20 to $30 range, whereas there are multiple additional contributions in the
competitive treatment at $28, $50, and $100, with the majority located at $50.
Qualitatively, the common reference point of $28 in the cooperative and compet-
itive treatments appears to have induced different contribution behavior depending
on the context. The cooperative treatment induced a large concentration of contri-
butions in the $20 to $30 range, while the competitive treatment induced an even
larger number of $50 contributions, close to twice the reference amount.10 Note that
the reference point had an absolute effect as well, in that there are numerous con-
tributions of $28 from competitive and cooperative subjects and none from control
subjects.
Figure 4 compares the cumulative distribution functions of contribution amounts
in the cooperative and competitive treatments where, again for visual ease, we trun-
10The probabilities of contributing between $20 and $30, conditional on contributing, are 29.2,
50.0, and 30.8 percent for the competitive, cooperative, and control groups, respectively. The
probabilities of contributing $50, conditional on contributing, are 35.4, 19.4, and 23.1 percent for
the competitive, cooperative, and control groups, respectively. Given the ex post determination of
these contribution bins, we are reluctant to draw strong conclusions. However, we note that the
rate of contributing $20 to $30 is statistically greater in the cooperative group compared to the
competitive group (p-value=0.05) and marginally greater than the control (p-value=0.13), while the
rate of contributing $50 is marginally greater in the competitive group compared to the cooperative
group (p-value=0.11).
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cate the distribution above $100. The contribution distribution from the competitive
treatment first order stochastically dominates the distribution from the competitive
treatment in this region (one contribution of $200 breaks this relationship in contri-
butions higher than $100). The p-value from the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test of the
equality of these distributions is 0.10 (this test does not exclude contributions above
$100).11
These observations lead to our second main result:
Finding 2. The distribution of contributions of the competitive group first-order
stochastically dominates that of the competitive group for the vast majority of the
distribution. It appears that the cooperative treatment induces more contributions
than the competitive treatment in the range near the reference point ($20-$30), while
the competitive treatment induces more contributions than the cooperative treatment
at close to twice the reference point ($50).
We conclude by noting a lack of evidence for heterogeneous effects in our data. For
example, recent research suggests that men and women have different preferences for
competition; specifically, that men prefer competition more than women (Niederle
and Vesterlund 2007). A natural corollary to this theory is that women may prefer
cooperation to competition, while men may prefer competition to cooperation. We
test for evidence of these gender differences in preferences in our setting, but find
no evidence of significant differences across the gender of the donor on either the
intensive or extensive margin.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
We present the results of a field experiment in which campaign contribution so-
licitations were sent to a large group of potential donors. The solicitations contained
11The cooperative and competitive distributions are not significantly different from the control
(not shown) with Kolmogorov–Smirnov p-values of 0.76 and 0.32, respectively.
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either information about recent contributions of those in the same political group (a
cooperative message) or the opposing political group (a competitive message), or no
information about past contributions (a control message). The competitive message
induced a significantly higher contribution than the control. The distribution of con-
tributions in the competitive treatment (nearly) first order stochastically dominates
that of the cooperative treatment. It appears that, while members of the cooperative
group were more likely to contribute around the stated reference point of their peers,
the members of the competitive group were more likely to contribute an amount of
nearly twice the stated reference point.
The behavior elicited in this experiment is consistent with a variety of explana-
tions, which we cannot distinguish with our experimental design. In their experiment,
Frey and Meier (2004) identify three potential explanations for people to contribute
more to a public good as a result of social information about their peers: people may
desire to conform to social norms; people may exhibit some level of fairness-based
preferences; and contributions by others may signal the quality of the public good
(in this case, the candidate).
In a competitive public goods framework, players also have reasons to change
their behavior when given information about contributions of players on the oppos-
ing group. For example, as demonstrated in past research (Cox et al. 1983, Holt
and Sherman 1994), people appear to receive utility from winning in competitive set-
tings, perhaps leading them to contribute higher amounts. However, even a purely
outcome-oriented person might be induced to change her contribution decision as
a result of social information if it changes her perception about the distribution of
potential total contributions of the opposing group. Future research should strive
to understand the precise way that these motivations interact, and their potential
impact on profit-maximizing solicitation behavior.
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Figure 1: The solitication postcards. From left to right, the control, cooperative,
and competitive treatments.
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Figure 2: Histograms of the non-zero contribution amounts for the control, cooper-
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Figure 3: The difference between contribution amounts for non-zero contributions:











0 25 50 75 100










0 25 50 75 100
Dollars
Competitive treatment over the control
Note: Sample is truncated above contributions of $100.
18




















Cooperative treatment Competitive treatment
Note: Sample is truncated above contributions of $100.
19
Table 1: Pre-treatment summary statistics and balance across groups.







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Male 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.47 0.23 0.57 0.53
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age 61.42 61.90 61.14 61.22 0.04** 0.07* 0.82
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26)
RegisteredEDemocrat 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.90 0.22 1.00 0.22
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
RegisteredERepublican 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.07* 0.63 0.18
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
RegisteredEwithEotherEparty 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.68 0.12 0.25
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
RegisteredEwithEnoEparty 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.81 0.83 0.65
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
VotedEinEaEprimary 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.68 0.51 0.80
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
White 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.85 0.26 0.88 0.20
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Black 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.54 0.18 0.46
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observa+ons 8,712 2909 2913 2890
0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.96 0.37 0.34
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)










Table 2: Contribution rates and amounts across treatment groups.









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Contribu+on6rate 1.11 0.78 1.08 1.45 0.24 0.01*** 0.16 0.04**
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Mean6contribu+on6($) 0.70 0.53 0.60 0.96 0.74 0.06* 0.12 0.13
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
63.10 67.31 55.64 66.42 0.47 0.95 0.43 0.68
(12.17) (10.34) (8.95)
Number6of6contributors 110 26 36 48






Table 3: Contribution rates and amounts, controlling for pre-treatment observables.






(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coopera/ve0treatment 0.004 0.003 0.076 0.073
(0.003) (0.003) (0.227) (0.227)
Compe//ve0treatment 0.007** 0.006** 0.432* 0.427*
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